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SHOULD CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE BE LEGALIZED?
REFLECTIONS ON COERCIVE PROTEST AND
THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME OF LAW
by
George Danzig Levine*

T

HE ensuing discourse is divided into three parts. The first part adumbrates the status of civil disobedience under existing law and discusses
the issue of whether the legalization of civil disobedience is consistent with
the letter and spirit of reigning legal principles. The second part describes
possible methods of legalizing civil disobedience, their deficiencies as legal
instrumentalities and their practical disadvantages. The third and last part
seeks to show that the excessive use of civil disobedience or its legalization,
whatever the form of legalization, is incompatible with democratic theory;
that is, it is inconsistent with the various philosophic bases and social
prerequisites of the free society and is objectionable on policy grounds
because it hinders rather than assists the effective operation of democratic
institutions.
I.

ACTIVIST DISSENT AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The law of free expression in the United States has been a continual
exercise in change. Like other branches of the law, it has responded,
although with an imperfect sensitivity, to modifications in underlying social
circumstances. It has accommodated itself to innovations in the tactics of
expression through creative advance in the realm of legal doctrine. In
delineating the limits of free speech and free press at given stages in our
societal career, the law of free expression has reflected differing conceptions of the proper dividing line between liberty and authority.
When public opinion has been sharply articulated in the expression of an
outlook strongly and widely held, the law has often recognized and enforced
dominant civic intuitions of policy and the established consensus regarding an
appropriate balance between the values of freedom and security. In those
eras of our history when legal development has been less impressed with the
shaping force of the popular will or judicially perceived exigencies of public
policy, the boundaries of protected utterance sometimes have been drawn
by constitutional courts in accordance with their own conceptions of the
nature of the free speech, free press, and free assembly guarantees of the
United States Constitution's first amendment' and the liberty protected by
* B.A. Cornell University; LL.B., Syracuse University College of Law; former Deputy
Chief, Appeals Bureau, Nassau County District Attorney's Office; former Assistant Attorney
General of New York State; former Counsel to the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Firearms and Ammunition; presently counsel to the New York State Senate Standing
Committee on Labor.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances." As may be seen, this amendment functions as a
limitation only upon federal governmental actions.
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the fourteenth amendment's due process clause2 (which has been held by the
United States Supreme Court to forbid suppression by state governments of
these same guarantees) 3 and analogous state constitutional safeguards or the
supposedly necessary conditions of an effective regime of free thought and
discussion. Thus, the jurisprudence of free expression has exhibited cycles
of progression and retrogression, periods of indulgence and restrictiveness,
as it has emerged within the ongoing life of the nation.
In the contemporary era some observers have sought to launch the law of
free expression on a new phase of liberality, a phase which would carry it to
a radically new doctrinal level totally discontinuous with prior stages of
development. These observers press for a metamorphosis in our fundamental law which would add a new expressionary instrument to the armament of
first amendment freedoms by legalizing civil disobedience. If these
legitimizing proposals were effectuated, our scheme of individual rights
would be placed in peril and our constitutional system would lapse into a
crisis arising out of its own inner contradictions.
A novel problem confronting the law of free expression in our time is that
raised by certain tactics of protest and dissent employed by political dissidents, civil rights activists, and campus militants. 4 Where these tactics do
not entail violation of a constitutionally valid law, they do not present a
challenge to our legal system. The selective focus of this discussion is
protest activities which offend against valid law or university regulations in
order to publicize some alleged deficiency in existing policy or in the current
state of things, that is, activities which are civilly disobedient.
As used in this analysis, the term "civil disobedience" means deliberate,
illegal public conduct or conduct violative of university or school regulations, which is done with intent to protest publicly, on moral or policy
grounds, against the law or policy of governing authority, against some
fancied wrong, governmental or non-governmental, or to bring about some
change in human society. As used here, civil disobedience does not include
acts of law-breaking protest which are later excused by the courts on the
ground that the law violated was unconstitutional or invalid. This is so even
though most of these law breakers were not certain that their constitutional
claims or attacks on the validity of the laws under which they were prosecuted would be vindicated, and many authentic civil disobedients assert a
constitutional defense to criminal proceedings against them.
Civil disobedience usually is viewed as accepting and operating within the
prevailing form of government and is thus regarded as distinguishable from
revolutionary activity. For the purposes of this discussion, however, it will
be defined to include all disobedient protest whether its motivation is
ameliorative or revolutionary. As understood in this Article, civil disobedience is a form of direct action although not all direct action is civil disobedience since some direct action, e.g., legal demonstrations, is not disobedient
2. Id. amend. XIV: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
3. See note 36 infra.

4. That such tactics are not mere curiosities of the last decade may be seen from their

continued use by groups such as those opposed to the building of nuclear reactors.
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to law. Except where peculiar usage suggests a different meaning, the
phrase "direct action" refers in this Article to coercive forms of civil
disobedience performed either with or without expressed or implied threat
of violence but without actual violence to the person of another. Some of the
coercive forms of direct action will be described at subsequent points in this
inquiry.
First, we must examine the relevant case law to ascertain what forms of
protest come within the shelter of constitutional guarantees. In protest
situations what is involved is often not pure speech, but rather speech mixed
with action. Here, the Supreme Court has a well developed tradition to guide
it. For example, the Court has consistently held that picketing, being an
activity of information dissemination, is entitled to the protection of the first
amendment so long as it is peaceful; yet it may be inhibited by government
when it is coercive or enmeshed with violence or when it obstructs ingress
and egress to and from public buildings. 5 The Court has also held that free
expression may be curtailed when it is of such a character as to incite others
to illegal action or when it tends to create a breach of the peace. 6
This breach of the peace doctrine has evolved in a direction which is
protective of the prerogatives of free expression. In Feiner v. New York7 the
Court upheld the breach of the peace conviction of a petitioner who had
made an inflammatory speech to a mixed crowd of white and black people
on a city street. The speech included insulting remarks about President
Truman, the American Legion and local public officials, one of whom was
called a champagne sipping bum, and urged blacks to take up arms and fight
for equal rights. The Court said that while the police cannot suppress
unpopular views, when "the speaker passes the bounds of argument or
persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot" the police may arrest him to
prevent a breach of the peace. 8
Nevertheless, it should not be inferred from Feiner that coercive direct
action tactics designed to silence those voicing opposing beliefs can limit the
free speech rights of others. In Feiner the Court expressly based its affirmance of the conviction on the inciting aspects of the defendant's conduct.
The Court's holding declared that in the absence of such incitement, the
"objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker." 9
During the period in which Feiner was decided the Supreme Court was
conservatively oriented and thus was quicker to find incitement than it
would have been if its membership had been more liberal in outlook.'0
5. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (picketing obstructing ingress to and
egress from a courthouse); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941) (picketing enmeshed with violence).
6. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (conviction of petitioner for breach of
the peace reversed where solicitation for religious purposes involved no assault, threats, or
personal abuse).
7. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
8. Id.at 320-21.
9. Id.at 320.
10. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), reversing the breach of
peace convictions of 187 black student demonstrators. Although the majority opinion was
careful to distinguish Feiner Justice Clark's dissent noted that the situation in Feiner was "no
more dangerous than that found here." Id. at 243.
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Opinions since Feiner have, however, left no doubt that the prospect of a
hostile audience erupting in disorder or violence does not in itself justify
governmental action restraining the articulation of unpopular views provided the speaker has uttered them in a peaceful manner and without
employing a mode of rhetoric which amounts to incitement." Indeed, the
Court has implied that law enforcement owes a duty to protect the expression of such views 2 and that a conviction for breach of the peace cannot
stand when views peaceably expressed by the defendant are sufficiently
contrary to community sentiment to cause a crowd to collect and require
police protection.
As noted, the area of protected speech reaches its limits when speech is
publicly presented in such a manner as to be meshed with coercive behavior
or violence on the part of the speaker or where it is explicitly calculated to
incite listeners to illegal conduct. This limitation is necessary in order to
enable government to prosecute those who counsel or procure others to
commit crimes. Thus, speech is protected until it creates some danger of
coercive or illegal action; only then is it suppressible. 3
In recent years the Supreme Court generally has tended to validate all
those legitimate tactics of dissent and protest employed by the civil rights
movement to achieve its objectives. Its decisions have established that
peaceful demonstrations, including those involving large numbers of people,
are protected by the first amendment. 4 It is plain from a reading of the
Court's opinions, however, that when demonstrators indulge in violent
tactics or attempt to promote a general condition of physical violence and
15
disorder, the law may suppress their activities.
In addition, the Court has ruled that certain places, like courthouses,
jailhouses, and schools may be shielded by law enforcement from those
distracting activities of protest which would be permitted in public streets
and parks.' 6 Further, in United States v. O'Brien'7 the Court indicated in its
decision affirming the federal conviction of a draft card burner that while
11. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). In Cox the Court, quoting from a prior case,
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963), pointed out that "constitutional rights may not
be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise." 379 U.S. at 551. Accord,
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966) (the Court stated that "participants in an
orderly demonstration in a public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except
by the fact of the constitutionally protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react
with disorder or violence . . ."); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963) (the Court said
that the "possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if
they otherwise have a constitutional right . . . to be present"); White People's Party v.
Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1014 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 674-75 (N.D. II1. 1976); Allen v. District of Columbia, 187
A.2d 888 (D.C. 1963); Note, Student Expression on Campus and Interference with the "Rights
of Others," 51 DENVER L.J. 417, 426 n.47 (1974).
12. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963).
13. An obvious exception to this general rule is obscene speech, which is beyond the scope
of this Article.
14. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(involving 1500 demonstrators); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
16. See, e.g., Grayned v, Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118-20 (1972) (school); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jailhouse); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1965) (courthouse).
17. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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certain acts may be considered symbolic speech and, therefore, entitled to
first amendment protection, such symbolic speech is much more subject to
suppression and regulation than actual speech when it infringes on governmental policies designed to protect legitimate national interests.' 8
In light of this historical background it is not surprising that practitioners
of disruptive confrontation tactics have been convicted of breach of the
peace. Despite allegations that the tactics in question were protected under
the first and and fourteenth amendments, state 19 and federal2" courts have
rejected the claims of campus militants, and other types of demonstrators, 2'
that their coercive or disruptive activities were constitutionally protected. A
common theme in these cases is the judicial insistence that the first amendment does not guarantee the dissemination of ideas when it is done in such a
way as to interfere with the rights of others.22
18. Particularly interesting in this regard is the decision in Le Clair v. O'Neill, 307 F. Supp.
621 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 984 (1971). In that case a three-judge federal district
court dismissed a complaint attacking the constitutionality of Massachusetts' breach of the
peace statute. The district court had held that the petitioners, defendants in a state prosecution
for disturbing the peace arising out of their refusal to remove a folding table that they had
erected in a city welfare office waiting room in order to circulate literature and organize welfare
recipients, had no standing to attack the statute because their first amendment rights had not
been unduly restricted.
19. See, e.g., State v. Greenwald, 6 Conn. Cir. 85, 265 A.2d 720 (App. Div. 1969) (defendants forced their way through gate to area on university campus where employment interviews
were taking place in an attempt to disrupt the interviews); O'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441
S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1969) (affirming convictions of college student protestors who blocked
entrance to interviewing rooms in university building where the Defense Intelligence Agency
was recruiting employees).
20. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975) (student
demonstrators went about a college campus shouting and chanting "organize," "unite," and
"student power," thus disrupting the college's learning atmosphere); Blanton v. State Univ.,
489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973) (student sleep-in in lounge); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College,
415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) (demonstrations of 350 and 600 students on public street next to
college campus during which there was $600 in property damage, eggs were thrown, traffic
halted, cars rocked, and their occupants ordered out onto the street); Rhyne v. Childs, 359 F.
Supp. 1085 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975) (disruption of classes by black
students attempting to enlist the support of black students); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D. W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F.22 638 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1968) (student
demonstrators entered grandstand at football game in a harassing and menacing manner,
prevented the college's president and his guests from seeing the game by holding a demonstration placard in front of their faces, eventually forced the president to leave the stadium, threw
rocks and bottles at him and his police escort, struck two police officers with rocks and one
with fists, blocked the president's auto, beating on it and rocking it); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F.
Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968) (student demonstrators, protesting recruitment on campus by the
CIA, blocked entrance to the building where recruitment interviews were to be conducted for
various firms, denying access); Board of Higher Educ. v. Rubain, 62 Misc. 2d 978, 310
N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970); Board of Higher Educ. v. S.D.S., 60 Misc. 2d 114,
300 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
21. See, e.g., Herzbrun v. Milwaukee County, 504 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1974) (employees
disrupted telephonic communications at a welfare center); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970) (Vietnam War protesters used napalm to
destroy Selective Service files; the court rejected the claim that the acts charged were protected
civil disobedience under the law, 417 F.2d at 1009, and the argument that defendants were
entitled in the trial court to a judge's instruction to the jury that the jury had the power to acquit
even if the defendants were guilty); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 586 (4th Cir. 1964);
Pritchard v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp.
336 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970); State v. Petty, 24 Conn. Supp. 337, 190 A.2d 502 (Cir. Ct.
1962); People v. Martin, 43 Misc. 2d 355, 251 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Term 1964), aff'd; 15 N.Y.2d
933, 207 N.E.2d 197, 259 N.Y.S. 152, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 828 (1965); People v. Galamison, 43
Misc. 2d 72, 250 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1964); City of Cleveland v. Mechanic, 26 Ohio App. 2d
138, 270 N.E. 353 (1971) (attempt at coercive distribution of literature by stuffing pockets of
unreceptive passersby on public sidewalk).
22. See Note, Student Expression on Campus and Interference with the "Rights of Others,"
51 DENVER L.J. 417 (1974)..
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Various observers have urged that the unruly tactics of protest, dissent
and confrontation employed in the last fifteen years by political and academic activists be given approval under our system of law. Some have argued
that the campus activists who disturbed academic repose with loud discussion or shouted slogans, or who prevented those of opposing views from
speaking, menaced or imprisoned college officials, or blocked entry to the
college library or classrooms were exercising constitutionally guaranteed
rights 23 or should be shielded from prosecution by statute or judicial lawmaking. A similar standpoint has been enunciated by persons recommending
legal protection for like acts of obstruction occurring outside of the academic setting.24
One theory expounded by some who urge a place for confrontation tactics
within the constitutional fold is that such tactics provide a more dynamic
and effective way of communicating ideas than more genteel forms of
expression; therefore, they should be accorded the same constitutional
status as those moderate modes of utterance and assembly which have long
received shelter within our legal order. These theorists assert that the public
mind tends to be complacent and indifferent to matters not obviously implicating its narrow economic interests, especially the moral dimension in
public questions. Consequently, argue the proponents of this view, it is
necessary to give legal sanction to more forceful types of idea dissemination. Such forceful idea dissemination is desirable to ensure that the free
society's trade in ideas is vigorous enough to produce a thought life conducive to creativity in the dominion of policy, an enlightened and politically
enterprising citizenry, and an unremitting popular control of the teleological
and programmatic elements of governmental action.
The author's philosophic and practical objections to this approach will be
articulated later in this Article. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to observe that if
the activist theory of the first amendment wins its way to acceptance, it will
create the problem of how to impose principled limitations on the disruptiveness of the expressionary strategies invoked to arrest public attention, how
to formulate a priori guidelines to identify the boundaries of tolerance.
Our federal and state constitutions are based upon the seventeenth century natural rights philosophy of John Locke which conceives of government as guaranteeing the natural rights of each citizen. 25 According to that
philosophy, when the political community was formed, the freedom of each
member to enforce his rights to life, liberty, and property was deposited
with the community. To protect these rights was the mission assigned to
government, the agent of the political community. Nevertheless, govern23. See, e.g., the claims of the plaintiffs, unruly college student demonstrators, in Grossner
v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). They advised the court that
the rule of law must not be overrated and that it should be subordinated to more fundamental
principles of revolutionary action. Thus, they insisted that non-violent occupation of university
buildings was necessary in that case to breathe life into the first amendment. Id. at 545.
24. Some examples of such acts are: pouring blood on or otherwise interfering with draft
boards files; conducting disruptive sit-ins or indulging in obstructive activity in the offices of
public officials which prevent the use of those offices by the public; silencing opposing
speakers in public parks; and similar interference.
25. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
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ment, as trustee of civil society, was given only that degree of power to
regulate liberty necessary to fulfill government's role as protector of individual liberty against the encroachments of those private persons who would
infringe and diminish the liberty of their fellow citizens.
On this theory, state governments, as protectors of the liberties of law
abiding citizens against invasion by aggressors, have enacted criminal laws
contrived to accord to each citizen an equal ambit of autonomy and to
prevent trespass upon this sector of prerogative by contrary interests or
antisocial forces. Thus, the criminal law prohibits kidnapping and similar
private activity which narrows the freedom of action of the individual
citizen. This ideology shaped the thinking of the authors of the Constitution,
who conceived of government as being, among other things, the institutional
means by which private persons were to be constrained from interfering
with the freedom of their fellow citizens.
Our constitutions, federal and state, in both their historic inception and
indwelling purpose, are also designed to protect the rights of each individual
within the sway of their jurisdictions. It is in this frame of reference that we
should evaluate suggestions that our Constitution and our legal system must
recognize and protect the right of direct action and other disruptive devices
of confrontation politics whereby groups of private demonstrators or protesting activists suppress or interfere with the rights of other persons or
groups.
It is clear that protection by statute or legal decision for these presently
extralegal activities would be incompatible with the principles approved by
the Supreme Court in its first and fourteenth amendment decisions26 appraising such extremist acts and would not be in harmony with the philosophical
underpinnings of our constitutional tradition. Moreover, other grounds exist
for rejecting the proposal that the outlawed forms of action employed by
student dissidents and radical political activists should be granted hospitality
within our legal system even where those forms of action do not carry civil
disorder to the level of insurrection.
The Constitution's provisions have been regarded by the Supreme Court
not only as restraining the activities of state and federal government but
also, in the case of the fourteenth amendment, as containing potential
limitations on the activities of private persons. Judicial or legislative approval of such tactics as denying some citizens freedom of access to public
buildings, denying persons with opposing views freedom of movement, or
denying them freedom to express their convictions or opinions runs counter
to this aspect and certain other aspects of our public law presently discussed.
In support of this contention, it is pertinent to take note of United States
v. Guest.27 In Guest a six-Justice majority stated28 that Congress's power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment29 to enact legislation enforcing
26.
27.
28.
29.

See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
383 U.S. 745 (1966).
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court, however, did not so hold.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
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the right to the equal protection of the laws, 30 guaranteed against denial by
the states in section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, is not confined to the
federal enactment of prohibitions against state governmental action infringing such right, although the fourteenth amendment mentions only the states
as the objects of its prohibition against unequal protection; on the contrary,
the power of Congress under section 5 includes the competence to pass laws

requiring that individuals avoid conspiratorial actions interfering with this
3
right to equal protection. '

A unanimous Supreme Court has more recently expressed an outlook in
accord with that of the Guest majority.32 It seems a reasonable inference
from the language of the separate opinions of Mr. Justice Clark3 3 and Mr.
Justice Brennan, 34 each joined by two additional Justices, in Guest that
30. The particular equal protection right addressed in Guest was the right of equal access to
public facilities-a right the defendants were charged with conspiring to infringe.
31. 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black and Fortas, JJ.) (dictum); id. at
778-86 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Warren, C.J., and
Douglas, J.). Mr Justice Brennan's opinion states that:
A majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that § 5
empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with
the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers...
are implicated in the conspiracy . . . Congress is thus fully empowered to
determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the exercise
of such a right is necessary to its full protection.
Id. at 782.
Some authorities view the Clark and Brennan opinions' statements on this point as dictum.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1969); Nicholson, Campaign
Financing And Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815, 839 (1974). With respect to the Brennan
opinion, however, this view seems mistaken. It is apparently based on the erroneous belief that
Mr. Justice Brennan agreed with the opinion for the Court that the indictment successfully
pleaded state involvement in the conspiracy and, therefore, his statement that the statute on
which the prosecution was founded constitutionally could and did reach private conspiracies
was dictum. But Mr. Justice Brennan did not express agreement with this interpretation of the
indictment. 383 U.S. at 776 n. I. Thus, Brennan's opinion does not rest on this point but, on the
contrary, is grounded on his assertion that the statute regulates private conspiracies and that
this feature of the statute is within the enforcing power granted to Congress under § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. See 383 U.S. at 781-82. Therefore, although concededly the Brennan
opinion is not an opinion for the Court, the portion of it concerning the power of Congress
under section 5 to exercise legislative dominion over private conspiracies constitutes the
holding of the Brennan opinion.
Nor can this holding be described accurately-as a dissent from the opinion of the Court. The
dissenting portion of the Brennan opinion was that segment which insisted that, contrary to the
holding of the opinion for the Court, the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970), did
comprehend private conspiracies. It is true that once having registered this dissenting view that
the statute did govern private action, it was necessary for the Brennan opinion to show that
Congress was given the power in § 5 to enact such a statute. Nevertheless, its holding on this
issue as to the extent of the legislative authority conferred by § 5 is not in dissent from the
opinion for the Court because that opinion does not reach that issue.
32. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973) (dictum). After noting
that the fourteenth amendment addresses its prohibition only to the states and not to private
persons, the Court remarked: "This is not to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe
purely private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
It has been convincingly argued that this latitudinarian exegesis of the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause accords with the understanding of its enactors. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353
(1964).
Lower federal courts have also found in § 5 congressional competence to proscribe private
conspiracies. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc);
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 347 F. Supp. 268, 295-97 ( E.D. Pa.
1972). Contra, Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir. 1976).
33. 383 U.S. at 762.
34. Id. at 780, 782-83.
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Congress has the same power with regard to the rights guaranteed in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.35
Moreover, it has been held by the Supreme Court that this due process
clause enforces as limitations upon the activities of state governments first
amendment rights,36 as well as many rights enshrined in other parts of the
first eight amendments in the Federal Bill of Rights37 which are preserved
inviolate against abridgement by the national government by these portions
of the Bill of Rights.
Logically, therefore, states are barred from such state action as enacting
laws or state constitutional amendments curtailing the civil and political
rights of any sector of the citizenry which are guaranteed by these provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights; this limitation on state action would seem
operable whether such state action is in the form of special dispensations for
the practitioners of repressive confrontation tactics interfering with the
rights of others or in any other form. Such state action would also appear to
be objectionable as violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause for denying equal protection to those citizens whose rights are
suppressed by direct actionists pursuant to the state's permission.
It is true that section 5's highly general authorization of legislation to
implement the rights guaranteed in the fourteenth amendment says nothing
specifically barring or allowing legislative regulation of private activity
impinging on fourteenth amendment rights. However, the legal position of
the Clark opinion in Guest, representing the views of three Justices, is based
35. See Comment, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and Congressional Power to Abolish the States, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 293, 304-05 (1967). See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 789 (1966), stating that Congress has the power to pass legislation enforcing the rights
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and indicating that § 5 of that
amendment is the source of this power. Id. at 789-90 n.2. The Court's actual holding merely
construed 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) as reaching conspiracies to infringe due process rights since
the constitutional issue concerning congressional enforcement power was not raised. Thus, the
Court's statement respecting that power was dictum. Nevertheless there is nothing in the
statement to suggest that Congress's enforcement power with regard to the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment is more limited than its power to enforce the equal protection
clause of that same amendment.
It might seem that Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), supports the proposition
that Congress is granted broad power in § 5 to enforce the rights within the ambit of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In Gannon it was held that the delegation of
enforcement power under § 5 enables Congress to enact a statute, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1970), prohibiting interference by private conspirators with the first amendment freedoms of
free assembly and free worship since the Supreme Court has held that such freedoms are
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment. Although the court in Gannon did not specifically
discuss the point, it recognized by implication that these freedoms are incorporated in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 450 F.2d at 1234 n.9. The statute involved in
Gannon, however, provides an action for damages against conspirators depriving persons "of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law." 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). This language indicates that the statute enforces the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and not that amendment's due process clause. The court's
opinion in Gannon does not discuss this question, so it is not clear whether Gannon holds that §
1985(3) implements the due process clause or instead gives effect to the equal protection clause
and that the conspiracy complained of offends the equal protection requirement of § 1985(3) by
depriving the plaintiffs of those due process rights of freedom of assembly and worship which
other persons enjoy under the law.
36. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 277 (1941); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); E. CORWIN. THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
269 (13th ed. 1973).
37. See E. CORWIN, supra note 36, at 251-52, 391-99.
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upon the belief that Congress may so restrain private conspiratorial action
because such restraining power is reflective of the specific language of
section 5.3" The thrust of the Brennan opinion in Guest is that Congress is
capable of reaching private conspiracies because the affirmation of such a
capability gives effect to the enacting intent underlying section 5.39
These two opinions speak of the federal legislative power to reach private
"conspiracies," a natural locution in light of the fact that the indictment in
Guest alleged a conspiracy offensive to the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 241
proscribing certain conspiracies. There is no intimation in either opinion,
however, that the power of Congress would not extend to private action not
conspiratorial in nature and logic would suggest that if Congress may outlaw
the one type of conduct, it may deal in like manner with the other.
Both the Clark and Brennan opinions indicate that section 5 gives
Congress the power to pass laws penalizing private conspiracies that interfere with any of the rights safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. In Guest the equal protection right involved was the right
to equal utilization of public facilities. In the legalized civil disobedience
context, the equal protection right invaded would be the right not to be
subjected by state law to the unequal treatment and inferior status of having
one's expressionary and other rights subject to suppression by legally protected and favored civil disobedients.
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the letter, spirit, and immanent
purpose of the fourteenth amendment are set at naught where private
citizens employing disruptive or coercive protest tactics act under the
putative permission of a state law, statutory, constitutional, or judicial,
purporting to legitimize such tactics so as to interfere with the first amendment or equal protection rights of other citizens. Some of the rights which
would be interfered with are: the right to assemble peaceably; the right to
give voice to one's views; and the right of all sectors of opinion to equal
protection and equally favorable treatment under the law, including the right
to have government refrain from unequally protecting some persons by
authorizing activist protesters to suppress their rights.
Such repressive private conduct would be incompatible with the values
implicit in the fourteenth amendment, which is the source of the precious
civil rights recognized by the Supreme Court in the last twenty years. Thus,
a regime in fundamental disharmony with our legal traditions would arise if
we were to accede to requests of those who demand that the activist devices
of confrontation politics be given protective recognition in the corpus of
state law.
Moreover, if the federal government sought to pass such a legitimizing
ordinance, what constitutional basis could it cite as the source of its
authority? There would seem to be none. The only conceivably relevant
provision, the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause set out in section 5, appears to require that Congress, if it takes any action, safeguard the
38. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), interpreting the
legislative history as evidence of such intent.
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rights of all rather than enact special privileges for disruptive and coercive
activists. Such special privileges would, in effect, authorize suppression of
the rights of those who are the targets of such activists.
In Action v. Gannon4" it was held that the first amendment freedoms of
peaceable assembly and worship are incorporated in the fourteenth amendment which Congress, exercising its section 5 power to enforce that amendment, could and did protect against suppression by private conspiracies in 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). In Gannon an aggregation of black demonstrators disrupted white Catholic religious services to express their demand that the
church give aid to blacks in that area.
If we accept the reasoning of the direct actionists, it could be argued by an
extension of this reasoning that constitutional protection for direct action
should legitimate the same type of disruptive acts by white private conspirators against black civil rights advocates seeking peaceably to assemble
and exchange ideas as were condemned when used by black activists against
peaceably assembled whites in Gannon. Of course, in the present state of
the law, racially discriminatory suppression by private persons of attempts
by blacks to better their lot through the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed liberties would seem contrary to the dictates of the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 4' Consequently, courts construing
the language of a new constitutional amendment protecting direct action
tactics might limit its immunization of coercive direct action tactics in light
of the thirteenth amendment's policy unless the draftsmanship of the direct
action amendment precluded such a limiting construction, or unless it was
felt that the equal protection clause would prevent courts42 from giving
blacks a special exemption from the impact of the constitutional
authorization of direct action techniques. 43
In any case, if Gannon is correct in holding that direct action by private
conspirators interfering with the right of others peaceably to assemble is
violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), any state law purporting to legitimize such
direct action would conflict with the federal statute
and thus would be
44
invalid under the mandate of the supremacy clause.
The Supreme Court has also held that state governments have an obligation not only to refrain from infringing on protected rights, but also to act
affirmatively to guarantee traditional rights presently recognized in our
40. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
41. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), indicates that the thirteenth amendment
banishes the badges of slavery and the enforced inferior status ultimately traceable to it, not
merely state laws contributing to the preservation of that status. In accord with Griffin's view
that the thirteenth amendment is not simply a prohibition against state action is Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 506 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974).
42. The fifth amendment's due process clause has been held to require the federal government to accord equal protection. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364-65 n.4 (1974); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection. 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
43. Federal judges are bound by the fifth amendment's due process clause. See Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1897). States judges are bound by the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1879).
44. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2. This clause provides in part: "This Constitution and the laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme law of
the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
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Constitution. For example, in Griffin v. County School Board45 the Supreme
Court ruled that the federal district court could require the County Board of
Supervisors of Prince Edward County in the state of Virginia to tax
inhabitants of that particular county in Virginia and to use the money so
obtained to provide unsegregated schools. Furthermore, in the reapportionment cases the Court has interpreted the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause to require that states reapportion their legislatures in
accordance with the "one person, one vote" principle so as to secure equal
protection of the law to each voter. Similarly, in the right to counsel cases,
the Court has interpreted the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to
require states to provide counsel for each indigent felony defendant. 6 State
laws permitting some groups to override the rights of others would work
against the rationale of these decisions since such laws would constitute
affirmative state action rendering the rights of some insecure.
From the foregoing discussion it may be seen that the existing framework
of law, constitutional, legislative, and judicial, operates as a direct obstacle
to state constitutional, legislative, or judicial approbation of the presently
extralegal tactics of civil and political protest. As we have seen, some people
argue that the United States Constitution should be amended so as to give
constitutional protection to political and social activists who seek to justify
their infringements on the traditional constitutional and legal rights of others
by appeal to supposedly paramount social interests or allegedly higher moral
principles. In answer to this proposition, it may be observed that such a
constitutional instrument not only would be afflicted with an inconsistency
which would make its interpretation difficult in the myriad individual instances of its application, but, more, that it would contain the seeds of its
own destruction.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is clear that persons urging legal
immunity for disruptive protest tactics as valuable means of social i mprovement are proposing a regime which is totally inconsistent with existing
principles and are in reality making a demand for fundamental change in our
system.

II.

TECHNIQUES OF LEGALIZATION AND THEIR DEFICIENCIES

Let us assume that the decision is made by the authoritative organs of the
common life to legitimize direct action. Let us also assume that direct action
is to be given only a qualified legal privilege, depending on the strength of
the justification for it in each individual case rather than a dangerous
generalized a priori approval. The question then arises as to whether it is
possible to include in the legitimizing provision a standard affording a
principled basis for determining when direct action is too unruly, disruptive,
or coercive to receive legal protection. Some may reply that the courts or
juries reviewing instances of direct action in cases where it prima facie
violated some law could simply employ the same ad hoc balancing approach
45. 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
46. See Comment, supra note 35, at 305-06.

1977]

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

that has been used sometimes by constitutional courts to delineate the outer
limits of lawful forms of expression.47
Such a procedure is subject to the objection that most juries probably
could not perform adequately a judgmental task requiring social vision and
sophisticated policy insight rather than a mere decision as to whether the
proven facts come within a legal category.48 Moreover, the suggested solution overlooks the fact that the first amendment adjudicatory technique has
a principle to guide it. Whether such technique uses the clear and present
danger standard, the distinction between advocacy and incitement, or the
interference with the rights of others as a touchstone to decide whether a
given act of expression or demonstration transgresses the frontiers of constitutional tolerance, it is relying essentially upon the same principle-that
which condemns expressionary conduct promoting physical disorder, or
interfering with the rights of others or with those educational or social
processes by which the common life proceeds.
Although the adjudicating tribunal's legalistic pronouncement invoking an
approving or disapproving rule of decision in a given case (e.g., clear and
present danger, absent or present) may be the outcome of overt interest
balancing or may constitute a screen for unavowed interest balancing, its
weighing of interests can nonetheless go forward under the directive of
principle, under the canalizing effect of the law's preference for physical
order over disorder and its disfavor of interference with the rights of others.
Even the most liberal judge would not be likely to extend first amendment
protection to a verbal act which is clearly inciting and has the immediate
effect of causing a riot.
But let us suppose that legalization of direct action is confined to the sort
of action which does not produce violence, riot, or breach of the peace.
Then existing law would be changed to the extent of protecting direct action
when it goes no further than posing the threat of physical disorder but not
when it goes beyond the threat to the actuality of such disorder. The
operation of such a legitimizing standard seems calculated to result in much
coercive protest which oversteps the limits of its authorization and degenerates into violence or disorder in the heat of the moment. Law enforcement
officials could not abort such a degenerative tendency in its incipient phase
because under the legalizing ordinance just hypothesized, unlike present
legal mandates, direct action which creates an imminent danger of communal tumult but not the actual turmoil itself is beyond the regulatory competence of the organized state. Furthermore, the just described limitation does
not give notice as to what type, degree, and duration of interference with the
47. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), for an instance of balancing in
the first amendment setting. First amendment ad hoc balancing in constitutional adjudication
has been criticized. See Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
It has also been defended. See Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 75, 79-81.

48. It has been proposed that the jury be empowered to acquit civil disobedients despite
their guilt where it is proved to the jury's satisfaction that the moral reasons for disobedience to
law outweigh the value of obedience in the individual case. See Hall, Legal Toleration of Civil
Disobedience, 81 ETHICS 128, 135-41 (1971).
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rights of others will be protected when such interference is not accompanied
by physical force or eruptive social turbulence.
To legalize direct action, however, would be to grant permission to create
such interference; otherwise the legalizatipn would be meaningless and the
law would remain as it is. Therefore, the question persists as to how a
constitutional amendment immunizing disruptive activity could set such
limits to its immunization as would advise courts and juries concerning the
boundaries of protected behavior and clearly inform prospective direct
actionists that they were not granted an open ended license to perpetrate
mischief.
The legalizing instrument would have to be a constitutional amendment
rather than judicial construction of the first amendment because that amendment grants rights of expression, petition, and peaceable assembly to all,
and, therefore, could not be interpreted as protecting direct action deprivative of the rights of others even where the protection was limited to exclude
deprivations effected by the direct actionist's unpeaceable assembly. And
such judicial policy making would seem foreclosed as much by canons of
judicial restraint deducible from the separation of powers principle inherent
in the structure of the Constitution as by first amendment wording. However, some authorities might argue that a constitutional amendment legalizing coercive protest should be held unconstitutional by courts using structural analysis as a methodology of judicial review on the theory that such an
amendment is incongruent with the rights-protecting thrust of the Constitution as a whole. 49

One commentator has attempted to provide a rationale for judging when
protest activity is protected under the first amendment. He has propounded
a test which would be used by judges in individual criminal cases to determine whether a defendant charged with violating the law in the course of a
protest is entitled to protection under the first amendment from criminal
penalization. His test is in two parts.5" The first part would be used to
ascertain whether the conduct was speech. If it was peaceful expressive
behavior and related to the issue inspiring the protest, it would be adjudged
speech. The surrender of a draft card in violation of law to protest a war
would be speech, in the author's view, because it is a non-violent act and it is
related to the war, that is, a relevant method of protesting the war. The
author also regards lying down in front of railroad tracks to prevent a train
from moving as speech, when it is a relevant way of protesting some
governmental action, because it is non-violent.51 Presumably, he would also
regard a sit-in in a convention hall which prevented its use for a speech or
political debate by the legislator who sponsored the law being protested as
speech since it is non-violent and related to the issue which animated the
protest. Even if such conduct were not considered relevant enough by the
49. For an appreciation of structural analysis as an instrument of constitutional decision,
see C. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); Levine, The
Proposed Federal Criminal Code: A Constitutional and Jurisdictional Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
50. See Velvel, Protecting Civil Disobedience Underthe First Amendment, 37 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 464, 466-69 (1969).
51. Id. at 469.
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author, and his statement of the "related" test is too vague to require such a
conclusion, it seems that non-violent coercive conduct which interferes with
the first amendment rights of others could be considered speech under this
test if it satisfies the demands of relevancy. 52 Certainly non-violent expressive conduct which encroaches upon rights other than first amendment
rights would be speech under this definition.
Once the protesting activity is adjudged to be speech, the second part of
the test comes into play. This second part is employed to determine whether
the speech can be prohibited. Under its provisions, protest activity cannot
be penalized except where it poses a substantial danger to or constitutes a
substantial interference with a compelling public interest. Applying this test,
the author states that the government could not punish the surrender of draft
cards to protest the war because the carrying of draft cards is useful but not
necessary to the efficient operation of the selective service system and,
thus, does not prejudice the government's compelling interest in maintaining
an efficient system. On the other hand, the author states that the conduct of
a stall-in by blacks on a city freeway during rush hour to protest the
exclusion of blacks from the work force constructing city freeways would
not be protected because it substantially interferes with the state's compelling interest in keeping main traffic conduits open during the rush hour.
Let us assume that the evidence adduced in a particular case, or possibly
the fact pattern charged in the indictment or information if they are pleaded
in sufficient detail, demonstrates that the defendant's prosecuted conduct is
protected under the two-part test. Then presumably the judge could dismiss
the case against him prior to the stage where it would be submitted to the
jury although the author does not discuss such procedural mechanics. However, if there was an issue of fact as to whether the conduct was engaged in
for purposes of protest, whether it was peaceful, or whether the government's interest was compelling, then such an issue or issues would have to
be submitted to the jury. The jury would then be required to render a special
verdict thereon provided it found the defendant guilty of the charge brought
against him. Probably the defendant should be given the opportunity under
such a system to prove the necessary facts by way of defense.
This type of procedure could impose added burdens and costs on our
already overtaxed judicial system because the jury or court would be required to hear evidence on the case in chief and also on the defense of first
amendment protection. It is true that the defendant could not take the stand
and deny guilt altogether without prejudicing his defense that he engaged in
the conduct complained of for purposes of protest. He could, however,
stand mute and force the prosecutor to put in his proof related to the charge;
then, if he felt the case had been proved, he could offer his own evidence
relevant to the defense. Arguably, he could even permit his attorney to
cross-examine fully all the prosecution witnesses on the case in chief with52. Examples of non-related protest would be the mass turning on of water taps in a city to
proselytize for increased employment opportunities for blacks and the surrender of automobile
operator's licenses to voice objection to a war; the turning off of water taps has no relevance to
the employment opportunities issue, and the requirement of carrying an operator's license is
not related to war.
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out fatally compromising the credibility of this defense in the jury's eyes if
he had clear proof that his conduct was undertaken for protest purposes. He
might wish to follow this course even if the protest motive were provable, if
he feared that the justification for it might not convince the jury. And trial
court decisions denying protection would often be appealed along with the
judgment of guilt, thus burdening already overburdened appeals courts with
additional work.
The only way of obviating this double judicial burden would be to enact
legislation providing that such a defense may be presented only under a plea
in avoidance in which the allegations of the indictment, other than those
going to the defense, are conceded. Of course, such legislation, and the
judicial policy establishing this two-part test, would probably be held unconstitutional if they were viewed as ordaining a procedure which permitted
direct actionists to impinge on the rights of others.
There are further objections as well to this proposal for protecting protest
activity. First, it is unlikely that this complicated two-part test would be
understood by most laymen; even with legal advice, they could not be sure
what conduct it protects and does not protect. It would take some time,
perhaps years, before the case law construing the relevancy and compelling
interest elements of the two-part test could give them sufficient specificity
to advise prospective protesters just how far they could go in the extremism
of their tactics. This indeterminate legal situation would probably encourage
much direct action of a type ultimately held not to be entitled to protection.
Consequently, such vagueness would seriously weaken the deterrent effect
of the criminal law provisions violated by civil disobedients and increase the
costs which prosecutory agencies would incur in enforcing such provisions
in order to preserve to them some semblance of deterrent force. Indeed, any
system of legal protection for direct action might encourage self-interested
persons and organized criminals to use direct action as an economic weapon
to force tribute from business firms.
Even when the emerging corpus of legal precedent had brought some
degree of clarity out of uncertainty, many direct actionists might not be
mindful of the limits it had established or dissuaded from excess by those
limits; they might continue to indulge in protest so ill-related to its goals, so
excessive in comparison with the urgency of the goals, and so frequent in its
incidence that the public temper would grow increasingly hostile to direct
action and inhospitable to its message. If direct action is not legalized, it will
be employed more sparingly and thus will not dissipate whatever impact its
optimum use is capable of achieving.
The rule permitting the defendant to prove by way of defense that his
conduct was motivated by an intent to protest probably would engender a
notable expansion in the use of law-violating direct action as many direct
actionists availed themselves of the opportunity of airing their views in a
judicial forum. Therefore, the courts would become political forrums to
some extent and when they vindicated direct actionists with acquittals, they
might arouse popular antagonism even if their decisions were sound applications of the law.
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This public disenchantment, coupled with the example of lawlessness as
well as law-sanctioned illegality and coercive irresponsibility continuously
inflicted upon public attention by the practitioners of direct action, would
ultimately subvert the rule of law if it attenuated the average citizen's
respect for the legal order and rendered him less inclined to accept its
injunctions as obligatory constraints on his own conduct. If legalized direct
action were to breed a general contempt for law or a cavalier attitude toward
its pretensions, it would succeed in undermining our system of government
and destroying the foundations of public order where alien ideologies have
failed. It is difficult to see how public disaffection can be obviated and how
attrition in the habit of law observance can be avoided when the ordinary
person perceives the law itself excusing violations of law-especially where
the people exempted from law compliance are often the sort of ideological
militants disliked and distrusted by the public at large.
It is sometimes claimed that direct action would function as a safety valve
by furnishing a better method for airing grievances than traditional forms of
expression and thus would, on balance, act as a preventive of violence and
ordinary forms of crime rather than a promoter of them.53 However, traditional means of protest, including legal mass demonstrations, do not seem
such a markedly inferior way of venting discontent that foreclosing the use
of the illegal direct action remedy as a supplement to them will result in
widespread violence. Such violence as does accrue from the legal unavailability of disruptive direct action, if any, can certainly be handled by the
forces of law and order. But if the man in the street is impelled by a cynical
disdain for our legal system to question the binding character of law and to
break the habit of compliance with law, there will not be enough police in the
country to save our society from disintegration.
Furthermore, it should not be thought that the confinement of protection
to conduct not substantially infringing a compelling public interest will save
society from suffering substantial disadvantage as a result of the operation
of the proposed system of protection for protest activity. Let us suppose, as
seems likely, that the proposed system's protection of protest activity insubstantially interfering with a compelling public interest or substantially interfering with a public interest which is not compelling encourages a large
amount of direct action in each of these two categories. The sum total of
such interference may add up to considerable social inconvenience and
invasion of the rights of others-enough to constitute a substantial infringement of compelling public interests.
In proposing this scheme of protection, the author states that his compelling interest test is justified by decisional law. This view seems mistaken.
53. There are studies which indicate that the quantity of violent crime decreases in black
areas where the inhabitants participate in direct action. See Solomon, Walker, O'Connor, &
Fishman, Civil Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes, 12 ARCHIVES GENERAL
PSYCH. 227, 236 (1965). Assuming, as the studies suggest, that direct action offers an emotional
outlet which reduces the aggression level, there is no apparent reason why such an outlet could
not be provided by legal direct action in the form of non-coercive marches and demonstrations.
Even a commentator favorably inclined toward civil disobedience believes that its use in
Birmingham was partly responsible for the riots in Rochester and Philadelphia. See Keeton,
The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 507, 510 (1965).
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The compelling interest doctrine developed by the Supreme Court bars
government from imposing indirect restraints on legal first amendment
activity unless the official action in question serves a compelling state
interest. The compelling interest test proposed as a protection for protest
activity would prevent government from penalizing such activity even where
it is illegal, if it does not present a substantial danger to a compelling public
interest.
It should be realized that if such a scheme for the protection of illegal
protest activity were put into effect, the consequent growth in lawlessness
and illegal direct action required to be evaluated by processing through the
criminal justice system would impose a substantial financial load on the
taxpayers. It would also preempt public resources needed elsewhere and
cause the diversion of police personnel from other law enforcement tasks
concerned with the control of organized crime and violent street crime.
Indeed, enemies of reigning political forces or of our democratic form of
government might take advantage of direct action's legalization to inflict
financial ruin on the public treasury by magnifying the amount of coercive
mass protest, thus necessitating astronomical governmental expenditures
for crowd control (an expensive process) and for funnelling masses of
arrested direct actionists through the legal machinery for determining
whether each actionist's conduct should receive legal protection.
Such an ulterior motivation for civil disobedience might operate even in
the absence of its legalization, but the number of prospective disobedients
willing to undergo arrest in mass coercive protests probably would increase
greatly where the legal system held out the promise of ultimate amnesty and
the immediate opportunity of a forum in which to give utterance to fervent
convictions. If the number increased greatly enough, the criminal justice
system might break down under the workload occasioned by an enormous
volume of extra-legal direct action or might be so heavily occupied with civil
disobedience cases that court calendars involving serious criminal offenses
would become impossibly congested. Such congestion might result in a
situation in which crime outstrips government's efforts to suppress it and,
thus, might render our system of crime control totally incapable of deterring
dangerous lawlessness.
III.

PHILOSOPHIC AND POLICY OBJECTIONS TO DISRUPTIVE AND COERCIVE
EXTRALEGAL FORMS OF PROTEST AND TO THEIR LEGALIZATION

A. Private intimidation and pressure tactics which prevent free expression are objectionable in contemplation of democratic theory. That unofficial restraints may be as injurious to freedom of thought and expression as
official abridgement of intellectual freedom has often been remarked upon
by libertarian thinkers. Any practice which restricts the circulation and
criticism of ideas is injurious to democracy.
B. Coercive modes of protest, such as silencing or shouting down those
of opposing viewpoints, abort the free exchange of ideas and thus interfere
with the attainment of truth-truth being tentative, emergent, and developing rather than immediately and finally known. The process of discussion
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must heed the irreducible rules of logic and submit itself to those minimum
disciplines which are the necessary preconditions to effective public discourse if government by discussion is to attain a refinement of imaginative
insight proportioned to the complexity of the policy areas on which social
judgment must act.
The devices of political activism may serve a useful purpose in the realm
of ultimate values when their practitioners accept the restraints of law.
However, when these same devices are used to mobilize communal opinion
concerning issues of instrumental means, the devices by which ultimate
values are realized, their serviceability is less certain. Clamorous protest
tactics tend to simplify the complex, to theologize public questions so as to
obscure their technical component and to force their solution through the
compulsion of an ideologizing vision. Such a vision ignores the factual
imperatives that form the limiting context within which policy insight must
function.
When political proselytization passes the bounds of vigorous expression
and assumes the aspect of coercive protest, it becomes an even more
virulent agency of unreason. In these circumstances, public understanding is
impaired rather than clarified and the achievement of an enlightened public
opinion as a check on official action in the area of instrumental means is
made more difficult.
Moreover, public ineptitude in the realm of methodology subtly distorts
political judgment as to ends because such value choices must be subject to
continuous review and revision in light of advancing awareness as to the
costs and benefits of given programs of means designed to implement the
reigning scheme of values. Such developing knowledge will reveal the extent
of these costs and benefits and suggest the necessity for change in the
hierarchy of value priorities lest the realization of some values be prejudiced
by the resource claims of other values. If the citizenry does not attain to a
state of knowledgeability and analytical precision on this topic, democratic
control over the goals of the common life will not be realized.
The exponential growth of governmental regulation in the 1970s and the
peculiarly technical and pervasive character of this contemporary regulatroy
process 54 places novel judgmental burdens on the popular mind. The harsh
simplicities of direct action militate against the emergence of the needed
technical sophistication.
C. The dictatorial tactics of coercive direct action may prevent protesting minorities from persuading the majority by alienating those members of
the majority who might be susceptible to a reasoned appeal but are repelled
by extralegal behavior. Conversely, such tactics may, by subduing contrary
opinion, force the adoption of policies a majority do not favor. Laws thus
imposed through the suppression of free discussion lack legitimacy when
54. See Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation," 47 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 49 (1977).
The authors show how inefficient and costly governmental regulation wastes resources. It
seems to this writer that if an educated community sentiment forced an improvement in
regulatory performance, the funds thus saved could be used to implement new values. In this
way, as well, a populace accomplished in the sector of means may induce change in the
structure of communal ends.
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tested against the moral imperatives of democratic theory. They are as
objectionable as the dictates of authoritarian rulers.
D. Confrontation protest activity suppressing the free speech of others
is inconsistent with the rationale of civil disobedience, which seeks to
persuade others of injustice through the educative force of principled symbolic conduct. The education thus imparted is deeper and more substantial
when those intended to be educated are able to discuss freely the issues
involved. Indeed, this process of education in the setting of free discussion
may operate in multi-directional form where it subjects the partial views of
the civilly disobedient to the corrective effect of more cosmopolitan outlooks. Such discussion cannot occur when free speech is stifled by the
tactics of repression.
When the democratic citizen is compelled by coercion to accept ideas
which his disinterested reason would reject under calmer conditions of
discourse, his integrity of personality is compromised and he is deprived of
that means of self-realization in which the free mind labors toward truth.
When a minority, acting in a town meeting, legislative chamber, or elsewhere, inflicts by the pressure of direct action techniques a policy which
could not win its way to acceptance by rational discussion, it violates
libertarian democracy's essence by rendering superfluous individual human
thought and responsibility and converting the free citizen, the characterizing
feature of the free society, into an imitative engine or an assenting automaton rendering mindless obeisance to a dominating force with no respect for
his individuality. In a democratic social order, this is the ultimate indignity.
For those delicate mechanisms by which human insight attains to truth are
the very means to that condition of moral growth which is the distinctive
potentiality of freedom.
In contemplation of democratic theory, public opinion is not a mere reflex
of authority but rather the uncoerced expression of autochthonous insights
welling up from the depths of the popular consciousness. When the prevailing structure of political thought is a mere epiphenomenon reflecting the
preconceptions of a dominant opinion clique imposing its dominion by
psychic power rather than a spontaneous coalescence of individual intellectual initiatives, democracy is traduced in its foundations.
Where the communal mind is the inert receptacle of received doctrine
rather than the self-activating source of originative impulses, where the
process of public discussion is perverted into an agency of repression
enforcing the narrow content of sectarian belief rather than a vehicle for that
creative interplay of competing standpoints which transforms limited perspectives into transcendant vision, the social preconditions of democracy no
longer exist. In such a situation, public discourse is not a useful device for
revealing the ever-changing disposition of social interests which underlies
the formal apparatus of the organized state and which it is the function of
democratic government to identify and harmonize.
E. Such disruptive activities prevent or short circuit the careful and
patient bargaining which leads to compromise. Thus, they are not conducive
to the gradual evolution of consensus in public sentiment and in the legisla-
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tive halls through the democratic procedure of discussion and reconciliation
of differences which otherwise might occur when the protestants are proceeding from a strong moral or practical position.
F. While more traditional-minded advocates of similar proselytizing
standpoints may still seek compromises, their efforts will be handicapped by
the counter-productive activities of extremists. These extremists must either
win the day by force of will or run the risk of having their goals compromised by the counteractive response of an alienated majority or a stronger minority. If their strength is not sufficient to achieve success by coercion,
they are likely to end with a net loss.
G. It is sometimes alleged that coercive types of direct action are necessary means of asserting the will of the people against unresponsive governmental institutions. According to this theory, elections are imperfect vehicles for registering with precision nuances of electoral opinion or rendering
with exactitude the alignments of public sentiment on given issues.55 Some
would infer that from this insight the conclusion follows that when a civil
disobedient's protest violates the law in order to protest that law, or some
other law or policy, it cannot be assumed that he does not represent the
majority view or that the law broken or protested enjoys the support of the
majority.
But, although concededly imperfect, the election device is not as inept a
means of integrating public opinion into public policy as is sometimes
claimed. The legislative candidate who emerges triumphant from an election
will usually be able to ascertain through pre-election and post-election
contacts with voters, civic organizations, and political leaders and by scientific polling what the majority sentiment is in his constituency on most of the
prominent issues of the day. And usually he is not inclined to vote against
the majority sentiment. Moreover, decisions of the Supreme Court have
forced reapportionment of malapportioned congressional, state, and local
legislative districts. Therefore, where the legislative representatives from a
majority of legislative districts vote the majority view in their districts, the
resulting enactment is likely to reflect the majority view in the total legislative constituency, when opinion has solidified to the point where there is a
majority view.
Furthermore, the electoral mechanism is not the only way of ensuring
representativeness. It functions as an adjunct to other channels of communication between the citizen and his representative and as a guarantor of the
effectiveness of such channels, since the threat of electoral rejection serves
to ensure that the representative pays heed to the prompting of vox populi
revealed to him through these channels.
Among the devices for communicating strongly held public convictions to
legislative representatives are: legal demonstrations at the legislative buildings; mail and telephone campaigns; group and individual visits to legislators' offices; mass meetings and conventions attended by legislators;
official statements by organizations with large memberships; etc. Even the
55. See, e.g., A. BICKEL. THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 16-18 (1975), reviewed in Levy, Book
Review, 31 Sw. L.J. 615 (1977).
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nonelective independent regulatory agencies are not indifferent to outpourings of popular feeling asserted through like means. In addition, the commissioners of such agencies face the ordeal of periodic appointment, and, in the
interim, rely on the executive and the legislature for operating funds; thus,
they are not disposed to be unresponsive when the people ardently desire a
particular policy approach and communicate their desire to the agency in
question and to the legislature and the executive as well. Furthermore, when
such agencies are guilty of administrative arbitrariness, their decisions are
reviewable in the courts.
It is not clear why it should be thought that coercive direct action, which is
usually undertaken by dissenting groups championing views held by minor
segments of the populace, is a more accurate barometer of majority opinion
than the traditional forms of communication and sources of information just
described. Nor is it clear why it is needed as a supplement to the threat of
electoral rejection to force legislators to act in accordance with majority
viewpoints when these are known to them. The legislator indifferent to
popular disfavor is not likely to be dissuaded from his course by direct
action protests. Indeed, when we reach the stage where legislators can be
brought to respect the clearly defined majority will only by such coercion,
democracy really will be in extremis.
More often than not, legislative unresponsiveness to a particular proselytizing initiative is attributable to the fact that the proposal put forward does
not command majority support or even substantial support within the electorate, or that its supporters have not fully exploited the traditional avenues
of persuasion. It is true that where public opinion has not crystallized into a
firm, publicly assertive majority on a particular issue, special interest
groups, which are not confined to economic interest groups, may exert an
undue sway on public policy relevant to that issue. But legal demonstrations
and other legal means of legislative contact and political action give countervailing viewpoints ample scope to expose and oppose the influence of
narrowly motivated or self-seeking interests. If such exposure and successful opposition does not occur, it is not because traditional expressionary
devices cannot be employed effectively in this context, but merely because
they have not been pursued vigorously in the individual case.
Nor is it probable that legalized coercive protest would be significantly
more, if any more, effective in crystallizing majorities on important issues
than traditional forms of proselytization. If used repeatedly, it might well
irritate rather than inspire the public mind. And where it was effective, it
might lead the public in the wrong direction or degrade the quality of public
opinion by lowering the tone of public discourse in the manner described
elsewhere in this discussion.
Certainly any added dimension of expressionary effect likely to be provided in such a situation by coercive protest would not be sufficient to
justify the evils which it would be reasonable to expect if such protest were
legalized. Indeed, if such legalization were to become a reality, the pressure
of direct action might be exercised as often in behalf of partial views as in
support of worthy causes and, for all its apparent openness and visibility,
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direct action might be just as useful in advancing the fortunes of special
interests or restricted outlooks as legislative lobbying (a perfectly legal mode
of political activity often invoked by high minded civic groups) and other
familiar methods of influencing governmental action.
When a dissenting group seeks to impose its moral convictions in the
absence of majority assent through the agency of coercive civil disobedience to law, its actions constitute an attempt to enthrone government by
minority and to compel the majority to reject the dictates of its conscience
and to be ruled by the conscience of the minority. Such a regime of compulsion is wholly inconsistent with the principle of respect for human conscience on which the theory of civil disobedience is based and on which the
minority purports to act.
It is also incompatible with the democratic principle that government
should rest on the freely given consent of the governed as manifested at any
given time by a consenting majority. It can never be justified morally within
the framework of democratic theory (if the legislative policy is considered
unconstitutional, further non-coercive dialogue of persuasion or invocation
of judicial relief is the proper corrective) although some would say that it
may be validated by a higher law beyond the realm of government where the
majority's position in effect approves of injustice or inhuman treatment so
extreme as to be intolerable under civilized standards or grants rights whose
exercise is oppressive to others.
Although the theoreticians of direct action argue that their methods will
enhance the democratic representativeness of government, it is more likely
that a system legalizing direct action tactics will be one in which vocal and
aggressive minorities disrupt the democratic process of discussion and adjustment of views by which majority opinion crystallizes and is made known
in public forums. Thus, such a system may frustrate the will of the people,
not implement it more effectively.
The progress made in the last twenty years on the legislative and juridical
fronts in securing for underprivileged racial and nationality groups rights
and benefits previously denied them 56 attests to the fact that the democratic
system is not closed to such groups. It demonstrates that a strongly
motivated numerical minority may work effectively through their representatives within the system by forging legislative majorities on issues important to them through temporary and shifting legislative coalitions with other
interest groups. Indeed, it is the essence of our legislative system that every
issue majority is an opportune coalescence of discrete interests and that the
rule of the majority is in truth the sovereignty of fortuitously conjoined
minorities.
The preceding reflections are not meant to suggest that the raw approximations of political practice have or ever can approach that ideal of perfection which democratic utopians in every age have held up as a model for
mundane endeavors. The frequent failure of popular control in some of our
great urban centers is no secret to knowledgeable observers. The way in
56. For example, civil rights legislation and the establishment of poverty funds.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

which state and local legislators beholden to political machines for electoral
support have voted against the public interest for the benefit of special
interests rendering financial obeisance to these machines is a familiar feature of American political history.
But only one naively sanguine about the efficacy of civil disobedience
would suppose that entrenched arrangements of this kind could be rooted
out by coercive direct action protest where vigorous use of mass demonstrations and other legal forms of expression could not eliminate them. The only
feasible method of exorcising them, if any, is through effective organization
and unflagging political pressure in behalf of the public interest, assisted,
perhaps, by judiciously contrived control of campaign contributions and of
monetary benefactions to political machines by persons or firms doing
business with state or local government or subject to regulation by those
governments. Improvement is not likely to occur unless those elements of
the community with the political intelligence and social power to generate an
impetus toward change are moved to action in the cause of reform, and
illegal coercive direct action is not the form of communication best calculated to influence such people.
H. The defenders of coercive direct action point to the imperfections in
existing institutions of government and complain about what they regard as
the excessively slow pace at which such institutions inaugurate salutary
change. However, if coercive direct action is to be given legal protection
whenever democracy's system of representation does not work perfectly,
then society will be in a constant state of disorder because no democratic
system will ever be ideally representative-even assuming that one could be
designed to embody majority intuitions of policy more satisfactorily.57
I. The rule of law has prevailed because a state of things in which each
man is a law unto himself is intolerable. Where a person reserves the right to
invade the freedom of his fellows, he prepares the way for retaliatory
invasion of his own freedom. A system in which each individual decides
what law he will obey and whether he will disrupt the life course of others in
effect institutes the state of anarchy, and such a situation is a retrogression
from that social control of disruptive conduct which is the hallmark of
civilization.
The proposals to give constitutional sanction to disruptive and coercive
forms of protest infringing the legal prerogatives of others in effect mean
that, as to the persons subjected to the coercive force of direct action, the
Constitution would grant them rights of free expression while simultaneously granting to others a roving commission to suppress those rights by
extremist tactics. Obviously such a duality would afflict the Constitution
with an internal contradiction of the most fundamental kind-fundamental
because the process of discussion is the central process of democracy.
57. For some possible democratizing reforms see Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments
to Democracy in the United States, 92 POL. Sci. Q. 1, 17 (1977). The terms in which Dahl
discusses ways of ameliorating government by majority suggest that coercive direct action is
not what is needed.
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Such a regime would give coercive activists the right to decide which laws
to obey and when and would make the caprice of individual choice rather
than the considered will of society articulated in law as the determinant of
behavioral propriety. Thus, law would not enforce the comprehensive longrange interests of society in the realms of expression and political action.
Instead it would conduce to a social condition which was the product of the
accidental conjunction of a multiplicity of uncontrolled and narrowly conceived individual initiatives. Many of these initiatives would be the result of
parochial motivations unleavened by any sense of the larger social interest
or an awareness of how the long-term stability of society requires the
tempering of extremist demands in deference to the objective of compromise so that governmental policy may reflect the parallelogram of social
forces and embody that balance of social interests which is the prerequisite
of social harmony.
The noisy and coercive extremism of unrestrained, legalized activism
would tend to dominate public discourse and intimidate some public officials, thus forcing the adoption of some narrow and unbalanced policies. In
a system which safeguards the expressionary rights of all shades of opinion,
such unhealthy captivation of official attention is less likely to occur and
governmental policy will remain a distillate of diverging standpoints, the
outcome of a process in which the clash of interests is transmuted into a
composite, reflective of the broad array of outlooks which compete for
recognition.
J. It is occasionally asserted by proponents of legalized direct action that
their opponents are so deluded by a doctrinaire devotion to abstract principles such as the rule of law that they refuse to consider whether a mix of
traditional and activist political techniques will not in fact produce a more
responsive and efficacious system of government than the present one. But
the case against legalizing direct action set forth in this discussion is not
based on a conceptual analysis of political obligation or a manipulation of
legalistic abstractions or a blind adherence to the dogmas of legal positivism.
Rather, it is founded on the pragmatic ground that where the full range of
direct action behavior, not merely non-coercive civil disobedience, is given
constitutional protection, systemic disorder is threatened.
Even if the constitutional protection were ordained by judicial decision,
which can be abrogated more quickly than a constitutional amendment, it
might take some time before the habits of coercion generated by such a
judicial decision could be extirpated even if it were later disapproved. Inthe
meantime, the constructive processes of society would be disturbed by all
manner of activist disruptions. More, once such a regime of coercion is
initiated, it may be impossible to abolish completely, and an unacceptable
degree of valueless disorder might become endemic.
K. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that passive, non-coercive
civil disobedience is compatible with the preservation of an adequately
functioning free society, where it is not so widespread and prolonged as to
paralyze society's crucial processes of survival. Nonetheless, active disobedience to law which effects a suppression of opposing interests and
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viewpoints is a more pernicious order of disobedience. Once this type of
action starts, it may snowball to the point where the foundations of social
order are threatened.
At the inception of such an activist regime, one can never predict what its
end product will be. It may result in a minor and perhaps tolerable degree of
social disruption followed by significant new gains in social justice and
social improvement. Instead, it may produce a conservative reaction against
political novelty or, even worse, a social decline into anarchy followed by
countervailing forms of redress which cancel existing gains and institutionalize programs of repression that compromise and narrow our traditional freedoms.
It must be remembered that any minority which refuses to abide by the
arbitrament of democratic procedure invites other minorities to adopt a
similar posture of intransigence concerning their own special objectives.
This burgeoning obstructionism will prevent the attainment of an atmosphere in which these traditional democratic strategies of accommodation
may operate; it may also lead to actual physical warfare among minorities or
between a minority and the majority. Once overbearing forms of protest are
legitimized, more and more important social disagreements will be transacted on the level of force. Therefore, the inauguration of such a social
trend would be a dangerous course for any dissenting minority which cannot
muster a preponderance of physical force, since its failure to enforce its
aims by such means may result in the violent suppression of its legitimate
aspirations.
L. Proponents of direct action tactics concede that the tactics may cause
some inconvenience to the community but insist that the inconvenience is
overbalanced by the social gains which will result from the supplementation
of existing media of expression. The answer to this contention is that when
such tactics are given legal protection there is no way of knowing exactly
how much "inconvenience" will ensue, but it almost certainly will be
considerable as each opinion clique reacts to the opposition's disruptive
forays against it with disruptive counteraction of its own. Consequently,
civic life may become a continuous exercise in reciprocal obstruction in
which the harshness of the means employed intensifies progressively into a
perpetual state of riotous violence and mob excess just as the peaceful
protests of the civil rights movement were succeeded by the enormously
destructive riots in some of our large cities.
If such a state of affairs develops, it is bound to change the character of
American life fundamentally. It may give rise to the sort of widespread and
malignant social hatreds which impede the cooperation necessary for the
preservation of an adequately functioning society. It may engender the kind
of venomous and unremitting inter-group conflict that has often disfigured
the complexion of European and Asian politics.
Moreover, once direct action is welcomed by legalization, it will probably
be invoked with accelerating frequency. Increase in the incidence of its use
will confer upon it an enhanced familiarity which dispels its aura of eccentricity and gives it the aspect of an acceptable remedy. This augmented
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respectability may enable it largely to replace all other forms of expression
and political action as the social norm as men prefer the easy availability and
instantaneous impact of coercive styles of protest and policy advocacy to
the difficult challenges of rational persuasion and the slower-paced and
disciplined procedures of parliamentary government.
Soon, the slightest political or social difficulty may prompt immediate
recourse to the streets and once this tendency hardens into habit, the
complex rituals of traditional politics may be disdained almost universally as
old fashioned and ineffectual. 8 Thus will the essential nature of the free
society be altered if a system of democratic legislative institutions loses its
vitality as the central focus of government by discussion and surrenders its
primacy to an unstructured state of mutually coercive interest group interaction whose locale is the streets.
A legalized regime of direct action may spawn a seemingly infinite regress
of clashing, mutually suppressive confrontations when those whose rights of
expression are infringed by disruptive activists protected by law seek to
respond to such infringement by enforcing their views and suppressing
opposing views with the same coercive tactics. Thus, a legal approach
designed to legitimize extraordinary tactics for use in exceptional cases ends
by making these tactics usual rather than exceptional. And once they seem
usual, they are largely deprived of any capacity they had for functioning as
creative catalysts. When disruptive tactics become staple elements of political discourse they lose the flavor of novelty and with it their potency as
instruments for dramatizing issues.
M. Some theorists of extralegal direct action argue that disobedience to
law is warranted when one's rights are violated by the law. On this reasoning
many citizens would be freed from an obligation to obey the law in situations
where the law authorizes extralegal direct action because such tacticsbreeding like countertactics-might well become universal, thus subjecting
most citizens to such deprivations of their rights as would justify their
disobedience.
If direct action were given legally privileged status, probably many of the
people availing themselves of the privilege would be extremists with no real
solutions to our common problems or with solutions incompatible with free
institutions. Legalization of coercive protest would be likely to promote a
substantial enlargement in the number of extremist groups and in the membership of groups of this type now in existence; this, in turn, would lead to a
geometric growth in overweening activism.
The disruptiveness and disorder attendant upon such legalization probably would expand so widely that the consequent interference with the
rights and opportunities of others to free expression and the resulting net
loss to the free exchange and careful analysis of ideas and the creativity of
our thought life would more than counterbalance the alleged enhanced
expressiveness and enriched policy input reasonably to be anticipated from
such activism.
58. A similar trend toward proliferating and indiscriminate use occurred in India during the
period of Ghandian passive resistance. See Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36
U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1967).
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Indeed, coercive direct action may not contribute a significant increment
of expressionary competence beyond that provided by presently legal forms
of communication such as marches, conventions, speeches, and demonstrations covered by the mass media. Certainly this would be true if direct action
were used with such annoying frequency that the public was alienated
thereby. The violent and repetitive oversimplifications of direct action
vocalisms are not conducive to a balanced and thorough understanding of
intricate issues.
Some may argue that direct action is a better vehicle for revealing intensity of grievance. However, the strident and forceful rhetoric and the punctuating affirmation of crowd response which are typical features of legal
demonstrations attest to the dynamism inherent in currently legal modes of
expression and indicate that one need not interfere with the rights of others
in order to display intensity of feeling. Those who commend direct action as
a more efficient reflector of intensity really mean that it supplies an element
of coercion in situations where opinion cliques cannot get their views accepted as determinants of policy by mere persuasion alone.
N. Once easy and universal resort to the shrill and coercive simplicities
of direct action creates a general social atmosphere in which the public at
large is conditioned to respond emotionally rather than with careful rational
analysis, the psychological conditions of the democratic society's destruction are at hand. The free polity, which, through the facile surrender to bad
intellectual habits, has lost the capacity for calm, disciplined, and deliberate
thought, and apt and discriminating social judgment, cannot hope to meet
the heavy intellectual demands which are imposed upon the democratic
citizenry by the complex and massive social problems of our times. The
development of a habit of irrationality cannot be confined to the context of
its genesis; it will ramify pervasively so as to adulterate every sector of
social concern.
In such a setting of widespread social unrest and lawlessness, reason
becomes irrelevant, traditional restraints are weakened, and there is no way
to prophesy the resultant which will be engendered by the play of social
forces that is thus stimulated. A condition of semi-anarchy inaugurated by
those motivated by laudable objectives may encourage the emergence of
elements inspired by more questionable intentions and may prepare the way
for the ascendancy of dark and evil forces dedicated to the destruction of all
human values. For those who, out of a misplaced humanism, launch society
on an uncertain career of anarchy may not preside over it when the seeds of
disorder have borne their bitter fruit.
0. Scholars of democracy have often remarked that its fundamental
assumptions envisage the existence of certain basic social conventions
which constitute the indispensable social core of a democratic political
system. One of these conventions is the devotion, whether by habit or
conviction, to the free society's rules of the game, that is, an innate inclination to give the central processes of democracy precedence over any particular social or economic interest. It is only when the bulk of democracy's
citizenry is loyal to democracy's ultimate values of discussion and compromise that the bases of democracy are secured.
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When special interest groups confront each other in a posture of irreconcilability, when they are willing to press their selfish demands to the limit
rather than to submit to their adjustment through the democratic machinery
of policy formation, then the free society is in mortal danger of disintegration.
In a time of social flux, when radical attacks on moral and social norms
are the common currency of public discourse, disaffected groups are emboldened to extremes in their attempts to realize their ends or to enlarge
their power as a prelude to the attainment of those ends. Such groups would
do well to ponder the dangers which may accrue to those who stand insurgent against the status quo out of a facile belief that it will be inevitably and
implacably resistant to reasonable demands for change. The philosopher
William James once remarked that the inner mystery of democracy included
a sense of outrage at those who broke the public peace. Groups who
contravene this dictum by heedless action are inviting not only freedom's
demise, but the defeat, as well, of those particular interests which they have
charged democracy with ignoring.
It is short sighted to despair of democracy's capacity to renew itself by
transforming conflict into a creative synthesis which carries political life to
new levels and to reconstruct itself from within by the employment of its
characteristic processes for managing clashes of interest. Persons who deny
the ability of democratic institutions to relate the free society effectively to
changing conditions underestimate the power of thought in a free setting and
the dramatic legal and governmental changes which, in the last twenty years,
have made American political institutions more responsive to the needs and
value changes in the underlying social milieu.
P. Some dissenting activists have tried to justify illegal coercive practices by an appeal to alleged higher moral principles. But, in the opinion of
this writer, political morals cannot claim the warrant of objective underpinnings because values are ultimately subjective. While instrumental values
may be grounded in practical reason, the primary values which they serve
are not referrable to any objective standard beyond them. This author does
not accept the assumptions of natural law theorists on the ground that
natural law theory lacks semantic meaning for want of empirical reference.
It seems to him that there is no convincing answer to the relativist analysis
of political ethics. Even thinkers who accept the view that natural law is a
supreme ordinance to which all positive law must conform disagree as to the
content of natural law principles or about how they should be applied in
given instances.
In the political cosmos there is no absolute moral truth or authenticated
moral dogma or supreme moral position whose sovereignty over all others is
established by verifiable standards. Many shades of opinion may make
absolutist claims for their favored principles. If each were to employ disruptive tactics in behalf of such principles, anarchy would result. The characterizing ethic of democracy is that it has no ethos beyond the justification of
its essential processes. Democracy is based on the belief that no one gradation of outlook has a monopoly on truth or virtue and that value and interest
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conflicts should be resolved by democracy's machinery for adjusting differences of viewpoint, procedures by which competing partial views are combined into syntheses which embody more comprehensive and qualitatively
superior truth.
A political system in which an opinion coterie uses coercion and psychic
aggression to prevent contrary views from winning the adherents they might
attract if allowed a fair hearing and thus succeeds in enthroning its own
preferred values as the governing tenets of the common life is not a democracy; it is government by naked power when such coercive tactics cannot
claim legal sanction and government by the method of authority when they
can.

Q. Christian Bay has insisted that civil disobedience is an indispensable
aid to the growth of democracy because direct action counteracts government's tendency to become less democratic.59 Even if this contention is
correct, it does not necessitate the conclusion that presently illegal forms of
direct action should be granted legal protection. In order to contribute to
democratic growth, direct action must operate effectively and if legalization
results in its being used injudiciously or to excess, its usefulness as a social
instrument will be impaired.
Although the theoreticians of civil disobedience believe that the human
being in a political society has the moral right to disobey the civil authority
under certain conditions, most interpose the caveat that this moral right is
not absolute or automatic but on the contrary is restricted in its exercise to
appropriate circumstances. Appropriate circumstances would be those in
which there is a weighty reason for disobedience and a sound basis for
believing that disobedience will have salutary social effects outweighing any
social costs it entails. A mere claim that one has a moral objection to a
particular law or policy does not justify civil disobedience. Some thinkers
also believe that civil disobedience is never warranted when the disobedient
objects to governmental action or inaction on policy grounds rather than
moral grounds.
The advocates of civil disobedience agree that it is not properly employed
unless there is an adequate nexus, in the form of a sufficiently close
relationship, between the disobedient act and the evil protested and unless
the degree of disobedience is not excessive in relation to the goal sought. It
is usually agreed also that civil disobedience cannot be validated in general
but only through a moral evaluation of particular acts of disobedience in
accordance with sound principles. 6" Thus, a blanket a priori legalization of
direct action in general would seem uncalled for even if some form of
legalization were appropriate.
Moreover, the moral necessity that each act of civil disobedience be
morally justifiable would appear to impose considerable burdens of moral
59. Bay, Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society, in POLITICAL
Spitz ed. 1967), cited in Hall, Legal Toleration of Civil

THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 134-35 (D.
Disobedience, 81 ETHICS 128, 129 (1971).

60. See Cohen, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,9-10, 12-16 (1966);
Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 507 (1965); MacGuigan, Civil
Disobedience and Natural Law, I I CATH. LAW. 118 (1965).
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judgment on each prospective disobedient. Where relatively few acts of
disobedience are performed by persons of superior insight or political
sophistication, this requirement may be met. But when presently illegal
direct action is given some form of legal protection, the frequency of civil
disobedience is likely to attain such an order of magnitude and to involve so
many disobedients of questionable judgment and indifferent intellectual and
moral capacities that it is doubtful the stern moral prerequisites of such
disobedience will be satisfied in any more than a small minority of cases.
Habits of cautious moral analysis and self-restraint are not notable features
of militants.
Even if the prospective civil disobedient is intellectually and morally
responsible, the difficulty of gaining sufficient precise knowledge of the
factors relevant to an informed decision as to the justifiability of a particular
contemplated act of civil disobedience and of weighing these factors so as to
arrive at a balanced judgment would be great. Relatively few of the many
disobedients likely to take advantage of a legally protected regime of civil
disobedience would be equal to the task. Once there is established in favor
of the direct actionist an immunity from punishment for his illegality, even a
qualified immunity in which the disobedient act is subject to judicial appraisal, the amount of morally unwarranted direct action probably will be great.
It should also be understood that even when particular disobedient mass
protests have been rationalized carefully in advance as to their justification
on the basis of planned tactical limits, the probability that such limits will be
observed scrupulously in the heat of coercive confrontations in the streets is
not high. Mass demonstrations always have the potentiality of degenerating
into violent and riotous disorder. But when the law encourages protest to
assume a coercive aspect, the danger of extremist behavior is multiplied as
the passions generated by the coercive interaction of opposing groups override previously envisaged limitations.
R. It should also be recognized that the civil disobedient's cause and his
belief in it can only be dramatized properly and brought home to the public if
he is in danger of being punished and is seen to be willing to suffer the
punishment for the cause he has espoused. Thus, relieving him from such
punishment through the device of legal protection works against the effective use of the civil disobedience vehicle. Indeed, the philosopher Sidney
Hook maintains that the civil disobedient's act is defensible in the context of
the democratic society only if he voluntarily accepts the penalty provided by
the law for his transgression.6
S. Champions of civil disobedience argue that it has been a constructive
force at various times in our national life. Even if this claim is true, it can be
argued that the use of civil disobedience was more appropriate earlier in our
history. In that earlier time, malapportioned state and national legislatures
had not yet been reapportioned in accordance with the Supreme Court's
"one person, one vote" requirement, and the Supreme Court had not yet
broadened the official interpretation of the first amendment so as to protect
61.
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peaceful mass public demonstration and so as to assimilate symbolic conduct, with some qualification, to the category of protected speech.
Furthermore, that American society was able to tolerate and profit from
civil disobedience in the framework of legal prohibitions that mitigated
against its excessive use is not a persuasive reason for removing those
prohibitions. The better course would be to rely upon the discretion of the
sentencing judge to extend leniency to the prosecuted disobedient where the
special circumstances of the particular case suggest the social value and high
purpose of his disobedience and the special justification for judicial forbearance.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The widespread and continuous use of extralegal direct action poses a
danger to constitutional democracy. Where such genera of protest are given
constitutional legitimacy, they constitute an infinitely greater danger. This is
especially so in the case of groups, such as militant anarchists, that seek to
destroy the democratic state, rather than merely to use the irregular devices
of confrontation politics to change its policies more quickly than they
normally could be changed by traditional democratic procedures. If such
tactics are given constitutional protection, these fundamentally disloyal
groups may use them to achieve their avowed purpose of smashing our
democratic institutional framework and of bending the free society to the
contours of their own inner visions.
Those who are so impatient for change that they are willing to sacrifice
democratic forms for instant fulfillment would do well to remember that
immediate achievement of every fancied goal is not a prerequisite to a
tolerable existence but the conditions of public order and social stability are
the indispensable bases of long term social advance.
To postpone the attainment of favored civic objectives will not undermine
the foundations of civilization; a lapse into systemic disorder will do so.
Such a lapse will prepare the way for the progressive emergence of those
atomizing forces that disturb the social equilibrium in which persisting
patterns of endeavor are possible and will dispel that minimum state of
tranquillity where human creativity gives rise to cultural development and
there are activated those rationally controlled mechanisms of policy formation by which a free society makes apt response to its looming challenges.

